

I Would like to Take this Opportunity of Responding to an Article Which Appeared in Newsday on June 3, 1999 and Authored by a Mr. Walter J. Boyne, Titled

“Pearl Harbor’s Leaders Got What They Deserved”

Would like the Following to Appear as an Article in Rebuttal.

Pearl Harbor’s Leaders Did Not Get What They Deserved.

By John W. Bugler

Mr. Boyne States “*Almost a Week Before the Attack, the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshal, Not an Alarmist, Had Sent a Message Stating, “This Is a War Warning”*”

General Marshal’s message did not use the term “**this is a war warning**” . The Infamous “**War Warning**” Message Was Sent by Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark to Pacific Fleet Admiral Husband E. Kimmel on Nov.27.

It Read as Follows: “Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan Is Expected to Make an Aggressive Move Within the next Few Days. An Amphibious Expedition Against Either the **Philippines** , or **Kra Peninsula** or Possibly **Borneo** Is Indicated by the Number and Equipment of Japanese Troops and the Organization of Their Naval Forces. You Will Execute a Defensive Deployment in Preparation for Carrying out the Tasks Assigned in Wpl 46. **Guam, Samoa** and the **Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage..** A Similar Warning Is Being Sent by the War Department. Inform Naval District and Army Authorities. British to be informed.”

(Joint Congressional Committee on The Investigation of The Pearl Harbor Attack: Daily Hearings Ex.37, p.36)

So what have we just read. Washington has decided that any Japanese movement would be directly south. Guam, and, by inference, Oahu, were to be on guard only against **sabotage**. While the message was termed a “war warning” it meant war in the south pacific, not war in the Hawaiian Islands.

Admiral Kimmel was not warned of an impending attack on Pearl Harbor.

The dispatch to General Short

The message General Short received on November 27 was dispatched under the signature of Gen. Marshall. [Which the Army Board of inquiry after the fact said was so ambiguous and contained so many conflicting instructions that it could only be characterized as “ Do----- Don’t” Message.”] It reads:“No.472. Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot , repeat cannot , be avoided the **United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.** This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action .you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as **not, repeat, not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.** Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

(Report of Proceedings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack --Vol.42, pp 7927-28; Daily hearings JCC, Ex 37, p. 36)

Analysis of the Short Message from Marshall:

The message to Short was composed by three authors. This message of double talk is possibly a cover for posterity.

Note “ The United States desires that **Japan commit the first overt act.**”

Note “ undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary”
BUT “not, repeat **not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent**”

.Boyne states in his article “*If upon receipt of Marshall’s warning, they had put forward a maximum effort blitz for reconnaissance, flying their aircraft and their crews to the point of exhaustion, Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagomo’s fleet might have been spotted.*”

.In directing Short to engage in reconnaissance , “**as you deem necessary**” the general staff were manifesting ignorance that distance reconnaissance was a Navy duty in Hawaii and that Short had only six planes capable of distance flights. (JCC, Dec. 21, 1945)

Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey in his forward to *"The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor"* by Robert A. Theobald , writes, "We were sadly deficient in long-distance scouting planes. The only Army planes available were B-18's. These planes were slow, short legged, and unfitted for overseas scouting. There were not sufficient PBY'S---Navy scouting planes and good , old slow, and cumbersome work horses---to run a continuous 360 search without wearing out materiel and personnel. Nevertheless **had the "Magic Messages" been known to us, there can be no doubt that a 360 search would have been ordered and maintained to the breaking point of material and personnel."**

The "Magic Messages"

The most secret system used to transmit information between Tokyo and foreign embassies was a code known as "purple". Once decrypted it became known as "Magic". The United States Naval and Army cryptographers had cracked the Purple code some eighteen months prior to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. These intercepts are available today for public viewing.

This writer presented these decoded intercepts to a group of sixth grade students in 1962 and it was the opinion of all who participated that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941.

No other conclusion could be possible. But and I say again but, these decoded intercepts were never made available to the two men whose mission it was to guard our defensive and offensive forces stationed at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Throughout the first nine months of 1941, the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, following the common practice of all such posts in the American ports, had been reporting to Tokyo the movements of all U. S. naval units in the Hawaiian area. The interception of these routine reports had no significant value for U. S. Intelligence units. But Tokyo dispatch #83 of September 24, 1941, completely changed the character of the Hawaiian Consulate reports, and removed them from the routine category.

It read: Tokyo to Consul Honolulu, September 24, 1941 (#83) "HENCEFORTH ,WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU MAKE REPORTS CONCERNING VESSELS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES AS SO FAR AS POSSIBLE: 1. THE WATERS OF PEARL HARBOR ARE TO BE DIVIDED ROUGHLY INTO FIVE SUB-AREAS.
.....

The message requested information pertaining to the whereabouts of all warships and requested their mooring locations. It asked for types and classes of all ships. This message requested all communicating water routes; mention of the fact when and where there were more than two ships moored at the same wharf;

They divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and reported on all ship movements. In the days and weeks following there was an increase in the urgency of the dispatches from Tokyo to Consul Honolulu and return. Throughout November, Tokyo's interest in Pearl Harbor not only continued, it definitely intensified. On the 15th Honolulu was told to step up the frequency of its ship in harbor reports to two a week, Secrecy was stressed at all times. And November 29th was mentioned as the deadline date in the despatches to the Embassy in Washington. Why. November 29th was the day the Japanese fleet pulled out of Hitokappu Bay [Iturup (Etorfu) in the Kuril Islands] and set sail for Hawaii.

This was the perfect set up. Our fleet at Pearl Harbor was old. The ships berthed there on that fateful morning were old world war one stock. Their flank speed was 15 knots. In fact we lost the USS Houston at the battle of The Java Sea because it could not get speed up to 20 knots [to keep up with its destroyers moving thru a smoke screen]. These ships in the minds of some [in Washington perhaps] were expendable.

Why did president Roosevelt with prescience decide to move the aircraft carriers out of Pearl Harbor at the last minute. Think about it. The day before the critical November 29th Vice-Adm William F. Halsey, Jr was ordered out of Pearl Harbor. The Japs had counted on his being there at the time of their attack. The task force was ordered out of Pearl Harbor on November 28 to deliver a dozen Marine fighter pilots in Grumman Wildcats to Wake Island. The pilots had received such short notice of their departure that some had reported aboard with only the clothes they were wearing.

Adm. Halsey had enjoined radio silence and sailed with his ships darkened. Not until the second day out did the task force learn that the destination was Wake. The carrier Lexington was sent off to Midway Island. Both carriers, the backbone of our navy in the air age for some reason were removed from harms way at the last minute. Why?

In the week preceding the December 7 attack Kimmel, on orders from Washington, left the old fleet inside Pearl Harbor and sent two carriers with nineteen modern warships consisting of six heavy cruisers and thirteen destroyers, WEST OUT OF HARMS WAY. These two carriers, with their escorts were saved by this decision. This decision was not a mistake. It was calculated with aforethought. In fact this mission could easily have been performed by freighters.

Back to the War Warning of November 27th.

General Short replied as follows to general Marshall. Message reads: "Reurad (re your radio) four seven two 27th. Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy."

General Short in his own mind did not believe the Marshal "war warning" message pertained to a attack by air on Pearl Harbor. He would execute to "prevent sabotage."

Regarding the “war warning” message to General Short, General Marshall before the Army Pearl Harbor Board testified:

*“We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. **We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii.**”*

General Short, the commander of the Hawaiian department received no reply from Washington, either approving the measures he had taken or directing him to institute a higher degree of alert. He interpreted this silence as approval of the measures he had taken. His report was initialed or rubber by Gen Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson and Gen. Gerow. If they were dissatisfied with his action ,all they needed to do was give him an order . **They did nothing.**

General Short Was Not Warned of an Impending Attack on Pearl Harbor.

Authors Closure:

In closing let it be stated that anyone who takes the trouble to search through the records of this affair will come to the conclusion that these two commanders were deliberately kept in the dark as to what was really going on.

The messages they received were couched in such conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey the true danger directed towards them and their commands. This was the way it was meant to be. They were set up to take the fall . And take the fall they did.

They did not get what they deserved. But others in Washington should have.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
FOR PUBLICATION.

JOHN W. BUGLER
20 MINA ROAD
OAKDALE, NY 11769
516-589-7017

MR. BUGLER IS A LIFETIME RESIDENT OF LONG ISLAND. HE IS INNOVATIVE PROJECTS ENGINEER FOR THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION [R-10]. HE SERVED WITH HONOR IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHT YEARS. HE IS AN ASSOCIATE MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE.